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Abstract
Against the orthodox view of the Nash equilibrium as “the embodiment of the idea 
that economic agents are rational” (Aumann, 1985, p 43), some theorists have pro-
posed ‘non-classical’ concepts of rationality in games, arguing that rational agents 
should be capable of improving upon inefficient equilibrium outcomes. This paper 
considers some implications of these proposals for economic theory, by focusing 
on institutional design. I argue that revisionist concepts of rationality conflict with 
the constraint that institutions should be designed to be incentive-compatible, that 
is, that they should implement social goals in equilibrium. To resolve this conflict, 
proponents of revisionist concepts face a choice between three options: (1) reject 
incentive compatibility as a general constraint, (2) deny that individuals interacting 
through the designed institutions are rational, or (3) accept that their concepts do not 
cover institutional design. I critically discuss these options and I argue that a more 
inclusive concept of rationality, e.g. the one provided by Robert Sugden’s version 
of team reasoning, holds the most promise for the non-classical project, yielding a 
novel argument for incentive compatibility as a general constraint.
Keywords Rationality · Concept formation · Team reasoning · Game theory · 
Institutional design · Robert Sugden
1 Introduction
How do rational agents interact with each other? This question has occupied econo-
mists and philosophers alike, and game theory has become a common language in 
which their answers are formulated. Theorists adhering to ‘classical’ concepts of 
rationality in games answer this question by asserting that rational strategies in a 
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game are those that support equilibria as defined by Nash (1950), or refinements 
thereof (e.g. Harsanyi & Selten, 1988). Unfortunately, in many games there are only 
inefficient equilibria, as the notorious Prisoners’ Dilemma reminds us. There is a 
growing literature proposing that the concept of rationality in games be reformed, 
based on the argument that this concept should allow for the possibility that rational 
agents can bring about outcomes that improve upon inefficient equilibria. These 
‘non-classical’ concepts are underpinned by theories of practical rationality, such 
as constrained maximization (Gauthier, 1987) or team reasoning (e.g. Bacharach, 
2006) (both of which will be introduced in the next section).
This paper considers some implications for economic theory if the proposed non-
classical concepts were to be widely adopted, by focusing on the practically impor-
tant field of institutional design. More precisely, I shall draw attention to a widely 
accepted constraint on institutional design: wherever possible, institutions should be 
designed to be incentive-compatible, that is, the incentives of the agents interacting 
through these institutions should be aligned with the social goals that the institution 
is designed to bring about; or, stated negatively, it should not create adverse incen-
tives that may bring about unintended social consequences. Game theory plays a 
central role in the methodology of incentive-compatible institutional design: design-
ers devise games that implement social goals in equilibrium, and they aim to make 
institutions resemble those games (Guala, 2001). This methodology is based on a 
classical concept of rationality, and on a rationality assumption: it presumes that 
rational agents follow equilibrium strategies, and that the people who will interact 
through the designed institution are rational. Together, these assumptions imply that 
the designed institution will bring about the desired social goals.
What would the adoption of a non-classical concept of rationality imply for insti-
tutional design? Through an extended example, I show that many non-classical theo-
ries—in particular those that are put forward as rivals to classical rationality rather 
than as complements to it—are at odds with the constraint of incentive compatibil-
ity. That is, when imposing this constraint, institutional designers’ expectations con-
cerning individual behavior are in many cases inconsistent with the recommenda-
tions of non-classical rationality.
I then identify three strategies that proponents of strong conceptions of non-clas-
sical rationality could pursue to resolve this conflict: (1) reject incentive compat-
ibility as a general constraint on institutional design; (2) contend that the individuals 
interacting through the designed institutions are irrational; or (3) concede that their 
revisionist concepts do not cover institutional design. I draw out the negative con-
sequences of each option. First, rejecting the constraint of incentive compatibility 
would risk diminishing social welfare, which is a concern that is supported empiri-
cally and by principled arguments. Second, treating people as irrational would vio-
late a core principle of economic theory, namely the assumption that people are 
instrumentally rational (Herfeld, 2020), which most proponents of re-engineered 
rationality concepts are unwilling to abandon. Third, conceding that non-classical 
theories do not cover institutional design would seem to be a serious blow to non-
classical concepts. Concerning the third option, the positive contribution of this 
paper is to provide an interpretation of some moderate, non-classical theories—such 
as Robert Sugden’s theory of team reasoning—which could block the conclusion 
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that non-classical concepts do not cover institutional design. When these theories 
are interpreted as providing an inclusive concept of rationality, reflecting the pos-
sibility that both classical and non-classical behavior can be rational, they are in line 
with treating incentive compatibility as a general constraint and may provide a novel 
argument for doing so.
The modest lesson I draw from this analysis is that revisionist programs concern-
ing concepts that occupy important places in social scientific theories should be 
evaluated in relation to what changes they would necessitate in those theories and 
in how they bear on the social world, and whether these changes would be desirable. 
Starkly non-classical projects do not seem to pass this test in relation to institutional 
design.
The next section presents classical and non-classical concepts of rationality in 
games and Section 3 introduces incentive-compatible institutional design. Section 4 
brings together the previous two sections: it shows that non-classical concepts of 
rationality conflict with incentive compatibility, and it discusses the ways in which 
proponents of revisionist concepts might resolve this conflict, arguing that a more 
inclusive account of rationality might be the preferable strategy. Section 5 concludes 
by urging some caution concerning starkly non-classical projects.
2  Concepts of rationality in games
Concepts of rationality in games derive from theories that prescribe how games 
should rationally be solved. Classical theories place the Nash equilibrium, or refine-
ments thereof, at center stage, while proponents of revisionist programs ground their 
proposed reconceptualization in alternate theories, which share the implication that 
rationality allows agents to improve upon inefficient equilibria. I will first present 
classical theories of rationality in games, followed by constrained maximization and 
team reasoning as two paradigmatic representatives of non-classical theories.
In order to introduce these theories, it will be helpful to consider some simple 
games in normal form. Figure  1 shows the “Hi-Lo game”; two agents—players I 
and II—simultaneously choose Hi or Lo. Each combination of their choices results 
in a cell, specifying both players’ payoffs; player I’s payoff is shown on the bottom 
left and player II’s payoff on the top right of each cell. The payoff numbers refer 
Fig. 1  Example of a Hi-Lo 
game. Player I’s payoff is shown 
on the bottom left and player II’s 
payoff on the top right of each 
cell. A square around a payoff 
number denotes a player’s best 
reply to the opponent’s choice
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to the players’ utilities, which are measured on an interval scale, that is, the point 
of zero utility and the units of measurement are arbitrary, and the ratios of the dif-
ferences between utilities are non-arbitrary. Interpersonal comparability of players’ 
utilities need not be assumed. Furthermore, the utilities are not transferable between 
the players. What should player I choose? This apparently depends on what player 
II chooses: if II chooses Hi, I’s best reply is to play Hi too, but if II chooses Lo, I’s 
best reply is to play Lo; equivalently for player II. In Fig. 1, a player’s best replies to 
her opponent’s possible choices are marked with squares around her payoff numbers. 
There are two outcomes in the game in which the players’ actions are best replies to 
each other: both play Hi, or both play Lo. Furthermore, the players may also come 
up with strategies in which both available actions are chosen with non-zero prob-
abilities; for example, they could choose their actions depending on the outcome of 
the throw of dice. If players’ strategies include such plans of action in which they 
mix their choices, there is a third outcome in which the players’ strategies are best 
responses to each other: both players play Hi with probability 1/3 and Lo with prob-
ability 2/3, which yields both players an expected payoff of 2/3.
In general, a strategy profile in which each player’s strategy is a best reply to all 
the other players’ strategies (where strategies may be pure or mixed), is a Nash equi-
librium (or simply “equilibrium” in the following). Call individual strategies that 
are played with a positive probability in some equilibrium, “equilibrium strategies”. 
According to classical theories of rationality, then, a strategy is rational only if it is 
an equilibrium strategy. Because in equilibrium, no player has incentives to deviate 
from her strategy, classical theories establish a tight link between rationality and 
incentives. This leads Robert Aumann to state the classical view thus:
The Nash equilibrium is the embodiment of the idea that economic agents are 
rational; that they simultaneously act to maximize their utility. If there is any 
idea that can be considered the driving force of economic theory, that is it. 
Thus in a sense, Nash equilibrium embodies the most important and funda-
mental idea of economics, that people act in accordance with their incentives. 
(Aumann, 1985, p. 43, emphasis in original)
According to the most common classical theory, equilibrium strategies are not only 
necessary, but also sufficient for rationality (e.g. Binmore, 2007). This theory is 
sometimes contested because games can have many equilibria, some of which may 
be better than others for all players. For instance, in the Hi-Lo game, despite there 
being three equilibria, it seems “trivial” to many that (Hi, Hi) should be the unique 
rational outcome of this game (e.g. Gold & Sugden, 2007, p. 284), and “paradoxi-
cal” that standard game theory does not solve for this outcome alone (e.g. Bacha-
rach, 2006, p. 44 et seq.). It should be noted, however, that even though this cri-
tique sometimes motivates a departure from classical theories (e.g. Gold & Sugden, 
2007, p. 284 et seq.), refinements of Nash equilibrium, according to which play-
ing equilibrium strategies is necessary, but not sufficient for rationality, can rule out 
“bad” equilibria. John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten, for example, developed a gen-
eral theory that selects a unique equilibrium in a large class of games (including all 
games in normal form) (Harsanyi & Selten, 1988). In Hi-Lo games, their concept of 
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“payoff dominance” implies that only the Hi strategy is rational to play, thus ruling 
out the two inefficient equilibria.
In contrast to classical theories, according to which equilibrium strategies are 
a necessary condition for rational play (and in some of which equilibrium strate-
gies are also a sufficient condition for rational play), non-classical theories main-
tain that equilibrium strategies are neither necessary nor sufficient for rational play. 
These theories are motivated by a rejection of the implication that rationality results 
in inefficiency in some games. These theories thus imply that rational players will 
improve on these outcomes, at least under certain conditions. Hi-Lo games might 
not necessitate the adoption of this type of theory (because some classical theo-
ries can accommodate this concern),1 but Prisoners’ Dilemma games bring out this 
alleged shortcoming of classical theories. An example of a Prisoners’ Dilemma is 
shown in Fig. 2. In this game, it is a dominant strategy for both players to defect, 
thus (Defect, Defect) is the unique equilibrium. But (Cooperate, Cooperate) strictly 
Pareto-dominates this equilibrium, that is, if the players were to achieve this out-
come, both would be better off. According to classical theories, rational players 
could never achieve this outcome, since both would have incentives to deviate by 
defecting. Instead of interpreting these incentives as a constraint on what can ration-
ally be achieved, proponents of non-classical theories consider the fact that rational 
players will reach inefficient equilibria to be a weakness of the orthodoxy. Let us 
now look at two non-classical theories, constrained maximization and team reason-
ing, in more depth.
2.1  Rationality‑as‑constrained‑maximization
David Gauthier defends the view that rational players can improve upon inef-
ficient equilibria in  situations where there is grounds for mutual trust. He locates 
rationality at the level of agents’ dispositions to choose (rather than at the level of 
Fig. 2  Example of a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game
1 However, Harsanyi and Selten’s theory does not provide much of a justification of why rational players 
will reach equilibria that payoff-dominate others. Some non-classical theories can be interpreted as pro-
viding these justifications and might thus be used to justify particular refinements. I thank an anonymous 
reviewer for pointing this out.
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strategies for choices), and he defines “constrained maximization” as the disposition 
to choose cooperatively if the other agent(s) have the identical disposition, and non-
cooperatively otherwise.2 A population of constrained maximizers playing Prison-
ers’ Dilemmas could thus improve upon the non-cooperative outcome that “straight 
maximizers” achieve, who simply choose best replies.
This view faces the problem that straight maximizers could simply exploit con-
strained maximizers in Prisoners’ Dilemma games. The latter would then be worse 
off as a consequence of their disposition to cooperate, which would constitute an odd 
account of practical rationality. Gauthier excludes this possibility by introducing the 
condition of “translucency”. This means that an individual’s disposition toward con-
strained or straight maximization is known to others in the population with a positive 
probability. Thus, when individuals play against each other, there is a probability that 
constrained maximizers will recognize each other and cooperate, and there is a proba-
bility that a constrained maximizer will fail to recognize a straight maximizer and will 
therefore be exploited. According to Gauthier, it is rational for individuals to choose 
the disposition to constrain their maximization if this maximizes their expected utility. 
This is the case, roughly, when the choice of disposition is sufficiently translucent and 
the proportion of constrained maximizers in the population sufficiently large.3
In a nutshell, constrained maximization seeks to rationalize cooperation by plac-
ing rationality at the level of dispositions and requiring that these dispositions be 
translucent. The argument is supposed to rationalize non-equilibrium play in Pris-
oners’ Dilemmas and, more generally, in all games in which an outcome strictly 
Pareto-dominates all equilibria. Moreover, in games, such as Hi-Lo, in which there 
is a Pareto efficient equilibrium, the theory solves for this equilibrium. In short, 
for Gauthier, Pareto efficiency takes the place of equilibrium as the criterion for 
rationality.
2.2  Rationality‑as‑team‑reasoning
Furthermore, a number of theorists have criticized concepts of rationality that 
derive from best-reply reasoning as too individualistic. These theorists argue that 
players may sometimes reason from the perspective of “we”, instead of “I”, that 
is, as a team.4 When they reason as a team, players identify the action profiles 
(instead of individual actions) that best promote the common interests of the team 
3 For constrained maximization to maximize utility requires a combination of the two conditions—level 
of translucency and proportion of constrained maximizers in the population—such that the more con-
strained maximizers there are, the higher the risk can be that they fail to recognize straight maximizers. 
For a detailed exposition, see Gauthier (1987, p. 176 et seq.).
4 The following are some of the main contributions to team reasoning in games. Robert Sugden intro-
duced team reasoning to game theory in Sugden (1993). Michael Bacharach developed the theory for-
mally in Bacharach (1999). Bacharach (2006), which was completed by Natalie Gold and Sugden after 
Bacharach passed away, can be seen as the culmination of Bacharach’s theory, connecting team reason-
ing to findings in social psychology. Hurley (2005a, b) developed a theory of team reasoning according 
2 The canonical exposition of his theory of constrained maximization is in chapter 6 of Gauthier (1987). 
Recent attempts at rationalizing cooperation in Prisoners’ Dilemma games are Gauthier (2013, 2015). I 
critically discuss the latter analysis in van Basshuysen (2017).
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they form part of; they then choose the individual actions that jointly generate 
those action profiles. For instance, if the players of a Prisoners’ Dilemma game 
form a team, they may identify mutual cooperation as their preferred action pro-
file and choose to cooperate in order to bring it about. Team reasoning presup-
poses that individuals identify with the team that they jointly constitute, which 
has also been described as a transformation from individual to collective agency 
(Gold & Sugden, 2007, p. 292). As a result of this transformation, the players put 
aside their individual interests and act upon the interests of the team. This process 
raises two questions: how, exactly, do individual interests convert into team inter-
ests? And why would rational players act upon the team interests, which might 
(depending on the answer to the first question) require them to sacrifice individ-
ual utility to benefit the team?
On the first question, Robert Sugden (2011, 2015) argues that team play should 
yield the players a mutual advantage, requiring that the outcome is at least as good 
as the players’ maximin payoff (that is, the utility that each player can achieve inde-
pendently of the other players). A possible formal characterization of mutual advan-
tage has been provided by Karpus and Radzvilas (2018). They present a measure 
that can be applied to calculate which outcome(s) of a normal form game maxi-
mize the players’ mutual advantage, relative to possible reference points. By reach-
ing action profiles that maximize mutual advantage, or some other measure of team 
interests, rational players would implement outcomes, which, in many games, yield 
higher utility to the players than equilibrium outcomes. But this would often require 
them to choose contrary to their incentives, for instance, when cooperation is iden-
tified as the outcome that best advances the team interest in a Prisoners’ Dilemma 
game. Why would rational players do this? According to proponents of team rea-
soning, as a consequence of this “agency transformation”, the joint action of the 
team can be described as rational; entailing that the individual choices of the team 
members, which constitute this joint action, are rational too. There is disagreement 
amongst proponents about whether agency transformation is itself a requirement of 
rationality. For instance, Susan Hurley (2005a, b) defends a strong version of team 
reasoning, contending that team identification is itself the result of rational choice. 
Others, such as Sugden (2003) and Michael Bacharach (2006), argue that team iden-
tification or the failure thereof is not a matter of rational choice, but comes prior to 
it—as there would be no objective of choice without a unit of agency. Their theories 
can be interpreted as supporting a more inclusive concept of rationality because, 
when the units of agency are “singletons” (that is, individuals do not identify as a 
team with other individuals), what is rational to choose, according to these theories, 
coincides with what classical rationality would prescribe—while this may not be 
the case when individuals identify as (non-singleton) teams. For reasons that will be 
spelled out below, I am more optimistic about non-classical theories yielding inclu-
sive rationality concepts than those that exclude classical strategies altogether; for 
to which the unit of agency is itself a matter of rational choice. For comparisons of different theories of 
team reasoning, see Gold and Sugden (2007) and Karpus and Gold (2017). I present what I take to be the 




now, however, it suffices to note that, according to all theories of team reasoning, 
individuals can identify as teams, in which case it may be rational to play non-equi-
librium strategies.5
To sum up this section, we have distinguished classical concepts of rationality 
from non-classical concepts, by introducing orthodox solution concepts in game 
theory and contrasting them with rationality-as-constrained-maximization and 
rationality-as-team-reasoning.6 The distinguishing feature is that classical concepts 
bind rational choice to equilibrium strategies, whereas the theories supporting non-
classical concepts seek to rationalize non-equilibrium strategies that may lead to 
outcomes that Pareto dominate equilibria. Even though non-classical theories arrive 
at their conclusions for different reasons—team reasoning through group identifi-
cation, constrained maximization through individuals’ disposition to choose—they 
share some of those conclusions. For instance, both imply that there are conditions 
under which rational agents cooperate in Prisoners’ Dilemma games. Let’s next 
introduce the second cornerstone of the argument, namely, institutional design.
3  Institutional design and the constraint of incentive compatibility
Institutions can develop “spontaneously”, but they can also be designed towards 
specific social goals, in particular, generating social welfare. In the latter case, a 
designer seeks to devise an institution to govern some interactions in a way that will, 
if successful, maximize welfare. Typically, designers model the interactions in ques-
tion as a game, using game theory to determine how the interactions would result 
in different outcomes depending on the rules of the game, or mechanisms, and then 
choose the one that best promotes the defined goals. Designers strive to make mech-
anisms incentive-compatible in order to reliably produce desirable outcomes; let’s 
consider an example from Roger Myerson (2008):
The seller of an indivisible item faces one potential buyer. It is commonly known 
that the seller values the item either at $0 or at $80, and that the buyer values the 
item either at $100 or at $20. Let’s assume that the traders simply seek to maxi-
mize their profits, that is, dollar values define their utilities. The traders both profit 
from trade unless a type 80 seller (a “strong seller”) faces a type 20 buyer (a “strong 
buyer”). Whether they are weak or strong is their private information, but it is 
5 It should be added that team reasoning is sometimes put forward as a descriptive theory of interactive 
choice, rather than as a theory of rationality. For instance, when Sugden states his own position in Bacha-
rach (2006), he emphasises that he is “less concerned with the validity of team reasoning, treating it only 
as an idealised model of a form of reasoning which people in fact use, whether justifiably or not” (xxii). 
However, in other places he suggests that according to team reasoning, “the rationality of each individ-
ual’s action derives from the rationality of the joint action of the team” (Sugden, 2003, p. 167; also cf. 
Gold & Sugden, 2007, p. 285). Sugden might thus be interpreted as conceiving of team reasoning as a 
theory of rationality, at least in some contexts. Be that as it may, I am interested here in team reasoning 
insofar as it is put forward as a theory of rationality, as in Hurley’s account.
6 These are not the only non-classical theories that have been proposed, but they may be the ones most 
widely discussed in the literature.
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commonly known that each is of a strong or a weak type with an independent prob-
ability of 1/2.
The social planner wishes to come up with a mechanism that determines, depend-
ing on the traders’ valuations, whether trade should happen, and if so, at what price. 
Since the valuations are the traders’ private information, a mediator will ask them 
for their valuations. Depending on the information provided, she will announce 
whether and at what price the item will be sold. What could this mechanism look 
like? An obvious idea is the “split-the-difference mechanism”; whenever the buyer’s 
valuation is higher than the seller’s, the item will be sold for a price at the mid-
point between the two valuations, and if both are strong (i.e. the buyer’s valuation 
is smaller than the seller’s), the item won’t be sold. The table in Fig. 3 shows this 
mechanism. Each cell corresponds to a combination of the players’ types. The first 
number in a cell denotes the probability that the item will be sold, and the second 
number the price in cases in which it is sold.
But will the traders report their types honestly? The standard methodology 
of institutional design proceeds on the assumption that this cannot be expected 
because, for instance, a weak seller (i.e. one that values the item at $0) would gain 
from lying about her type: assuming that the buyer is honest, the seller’s expected 
profit from revealing weakness is 1/2(10 − 0) + 1/2(50 − 0) = 30; if she instead claims 
to be strong, her expected profit is 1/2(90 − 0) = 45 (and the same argument applies 
for the weak buyer). Thus, it is not an equilibrium of split-the-difference that the 
traders honestly reveal their types: this mechanism is incentive-incompatible.
Conversely, a mechanism that, unlike split-the-difference, does make it an equi-
librium for players to reveal their types is incentive-compatible. Continuing the 
example, we can ask what constraints an incentive-compatible mechanism must sat-
isfy. For simplicity, let’s make the following assumptions, which are shown in the 
table in Fig. 4. As before, if the seller and the buyer are both strong, the probability 
of trade is 0, and if both are weak, the item will be sold for $50 with probability 1. If 
one is weak and the other strong, the trade will occur with a probability q that does 
not depend on who is weak or strong. If the trade occurs, the profit of a weak trader 
Fig. 3  Split-the-Difference mechanism. From Myerson (2008)
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against a strong trader is some number y, which again is the same no matter who is 
weak or strong, as can be seen in the lower-left and the upper-right cell of the table.7
With these assumptions in place, we can ask what constraints the parameters q 
and y must satisfy to make the mechanism incentive-compatible. First, note that a 
strong buyer would only buy the item for a price smaller than (or equal to, sup-
pose) $20. Similarly, a strong seller would sell the item only for a price larger than 
or equal to $80. Therefore, the parameter y must satisfy the participation constraint 
y ≤ 20.
For honesty to constitute an equilibrium, we must make it an optimal response for 
traders to honestly reveal their types if they expect the other trader to honestly reveal 
their type too. It can be verified in Fig. 4 that a strong seller or buyer would never 
gain by claiming to be weak. But, depending on the parameters y and q, a weak 
seller or buyer might gain by claiming to be strong. Consider the weak buyer. Her 
expected payoff from honesty is 1/2(q)(y) + 1/2(50), and her expected payoff from 
lying is 1/2(q)(100 − y). Thus, for honesty to be an equilibrium, the parameters q and 
Fig. 4  Symmetric scheme with parameters q and y. From Myerson (2008)
Fig. 5  The 5/6-mechanism, which is incentive-compatible. From Myerson (2008)
7 The buyer and the seller are thus treated symmetrically. This assumption is only for simplicity; see 
Myerson (2008, p. 595) for how it can be relaxed.
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y must satisfy the incentive constraint 1/2(q)(y) + 1/2(50) ≥ 1/2(q)(100 − y), which 
reduces to q ≤ 25/(50 − y).8
Thus, a mechanism that satisfies the participation constraint y ≤ 20 and the 
incentive constraint q ≤ 25/(50 − y) makes honest participation an equilibrium and 
is therefore incentive-compatible. Setting y = 20 achieves the largest feasible prob-
ability for the trade to happen, viz. q = 5/6. This mechanism, call it the 5/6-mecha-
nism, is shown in Fig. 5. The expected profits (ex ante, that is, before the types are 
revealed) for each trader in this mechanism are [0 + 0 + (5/6)20 + (1)50]/4 = 16.67.
This example shows how incentive compatibility delimits the feasible amount of 
social welfare: the 5/6-mechanism yields a positive probability that the item will not 
be traded when the traders are of different types, even though this means that the 
item will not go to the trader who values it most. So ex post, after the traders reveal 
their types, the mechanism produces allocative inefficiencies in cases in which the 
traders are of different types but the trade does not occur. We saw that there is no 
incentive-compatible mechanism with a lower probability of such allocative inef-
ficiencies than the 5/6-mechanism.9 Thus, this mechanism determines the boundary 
of feasible social welfare when agents are strategic.
The same point can be made by comparing expected profits. There is no incen-
tive-compatible mechanism that would give both traders a higher expected profit 
than the $16.67 that the 5/6-mechanism yields: in technical terms, this mechanism is 
ex ante incentive efficient. If it were possible to rely on the players’ honesty and dis-
pense with incentive compatibility, then the split-the-difference mechanism would 
yield an expected profit of $17.5 for both players ([0 + 10 + 10 + 50]/4 = 17.5), thus 
improving upon the incentive efficient mechanism. However, institutional design-
ers do not expect individuals who will interact through the mechanism to reveal 
their private information honestly unless they are provided incentives to do so. For 
this reason, they seek to design the institutions that govern social interactions to be 
incentive compatible whenever possible; even if doing so delimits the social welfare 
that can be generated through the institutions.10
Note that, while the problem of incentive compatibility has been introduced here 
with regard to agents revealing their private information, the problem is generally 
faced by social planners. Of every institution whose outcomes depend on individuals 
revealing private information or performing actions that the social planner cannot 
fully observe, it can be asked whether the institution gives those individuals incen-
tives to reveal their information, or to perform their hidden actions obediently. Since 
it is hard to think of an institution that does not rely on individuals’ private informa-
tion and in which all the individuals’ actions can always be fully observed, the prob-
lem of incentives is ubiquitous in institutional design.
10 The limits to social welfare can be examined more generally: see Holmström and Myerson (1983).
8 It can easily be verified that this constraint is identical for the seller.
9 In fact, the “revelation principle” implies that, if the traders are strategic, there is no mechanism 




4  Non‑classical concepts conflict with incentive‑compatible 
institutional design
As we bring together non-classical concepts of rationality and incentive-compatible 
institutional design, we arrive at an apparent conflict: there are cases in which what 
institutional designers expect individuals to do is inconsistent with what they would 
do if they were “non-classically” rational. In the example from the previous sec-
tion, the constraint of incentive compatibility implies that the expected utilities of 
the two traders equal 16.7 at best (that is, in the 5/6-mechanism); but if the traders 
were to reason as a team, or to constrain their maximization, they could commit to 
revealing their types in the split-the-difference mechanism and they could reap the 
benefits from this commitment, receiving a mutually advantageous expected utility 
of 17.5. If the designer’s goal is to maximize the traders’ expected utility, she would 
thus only implement an incentive-compatible mechanism if she were not expecting 
the traders to be honest when they can profit from lying in split-the-difference. More 
generally, when institutional designers treat incentive compatibility as a general con-
straint, they do not believe that the individuals interacting through the institutions 
follow team reasoning or constrained maximization: for, if they did, they would 
expect that more social welfare could be achieved when dropping the constraint. 
The following three claims thus form an inconsistent triad: (i) institutions should 
be designed so as to maximize social welfare; (ii) incentive compatibility should 
be required as a general constraint on institutional design; and (iii) the individuals 
interacting through the designed institutions are non-classically rational.
Thus, in order to preclude inconsistency, (i), (ii) or (iii) must be rejected. I take it 
for granted that rejecting (i), that institutions should be designed so as to maximize 
social welfare, should be excluded as an ethically unreasonable position. If this is 
correct, we are left with two options: reject the assumption that institutions should 
be designed to be incentive-compatible (ii), or that individuals interacting through 
the designed institutions are non-classically rational (iii). Institutional designers 
would typically reject (iii) since, as we have seen, they treat incentive compatibility 
as a general constraint, basing their methodology on a classical rationality assump-
tion. What about proponents of a reformed rationality concept? They might either 
reject (ii), that incentive compatibility should be required as a general constraint 
on institutional design; or, they might take exception to the claim that individuals 
interacting through the designed institutions are non-classically rational (iii). There 
are two ways in which (iii) could be rejected because one could negate either the 
“rational”-part, or the “non-classical”-part of the claim. That is, non-classical theo-
rists could claim that the individuals interacting through the designed institutions 
are irrational, where the meaning of “rational” is fixed by their non-classical theory. 
Or they could assert that these individuals are rational, but not in a non-classical 
meaning of the word; in which case they would seem to concede that their theories 
do not apply when it comes to individuals interacting through institutions.
In summary, in order to avoid inconsistency, and assuming that we should 
design institutions to maximize social welfare, proponents of a reformed rational-
ity concept must make one of the following claims:
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(1) incentive compatibility should not be required as a general constraint on insti-
tutional design;
(2) the individuals interacting through the designed institutions are irrational; or
(3) institutional design should be covered by a classical rationality concept.
Let’s consider these options in turn.
4.1  Away with incentive compatibility?
Some reformers contend that incentive compatibility should not function as a gen-
eral constraint on institutional design. Thus, Sugden, commenting on this paper, 
argues that “mechanisms should be incentive-compatible with respect to the agents 
that exist (i.e. mechanisms should provide individual incentives to individuals, team 
incentives to teams). So I can’t see why a [team reasoning] theorist can’t happily 
take the first option and reject individual incentive compatibility in cases in which 
individuals identify as team members.” This is a well-motivated proposal since, 
as we have seen, (individually) incentive-compatible mechanisms would sacrifice 
social welfare compared to some incentive-incompatible mechanisms if individuals 
were to identify as a team and to act on the associated team interests; and thus, if 
we knew that they will form a team in a given case, we had better implement the 
mechanism that is (individually) incentive-incompatible but incentive-compatible 
with respect to the team of players.
This proposal faces an epistemic challenge, however, because designers do not 
know in advance whether those interacting through the institution to be designed, 
will identify as individuals or as teams.11 Arguably, they should then base the deci-
sion of whether to retain or let go of incentive compatibility on empirical evidence 
(cf. Hausman, 1998): should individuals be expected to behave in line with classi-
cal rationality in the institution to be designed, perhaps because in similar settings 
they have been found to behave in this way? Or is there evidence that in some kinds 
of institutional settings, they systematically identify as teams and that we could 
base our design on this assumption? Unfortunately, there is a paucity of research 
on this latter question; there appear to be no empirical studies to date on institu-
tional or mechanism design on the assumption that team reasoning or constrained 
maximization should yield the rationality standards. In contrast, whether individual 
behavior approaches classical rationality when individuals interact through institu-
tions has been studied extensively. In a survey of these studies, Daniel McFadden 
(2009) shows that individual behavior meets the expectations of classical rationality 
in institutional settings when incentives are large, even when the choice structure 
is complex. In contrast, when incentives are small and ambiguous, deviations from 
these expectations grow, which McFadden attributes to individuals’ putting less 
effort into determining best replies and being more distracted by irrelevant factors. 




These findings suggest that classical rationality may be a good approximation in 
institutional settings and thus, that incentive compatibility is important, especially 
where the stakes are high for the individuals who interact through the institution in 
question, whereas there might be room for relaxing this constraint in some lower-
stakes contexts.
While indicating that classical rationality may be a good approximation in many 
institutional settings, these findings fall short of establishing incentive compatibility 
as a general constraint, rather, this might be thought to call for more research on 
human behavior in the context of institutional design. Since it is less-than-certain 
that individual behavior will approach classical rationality in the institution to be 
designed, would it not  appear that the standard methodology—assuming classical 
rationality and treating incentive compatibility as a general constraint—faces a simi-
lar empirical challenge to Sugden’s proposal?
However, the epistemic challenge is less severe with respect to standard meth-
odology because there is a principled argument to be made for the importance of 
incentive compatibility, as is shown by the fact that even some pessimists about the 
empirical adequacy of rational choice theory have made a case for incentive compat-
ibility. Alexander Rosenberg (1992), for instance, argues that economic theory is 
predictively weak but nevertheless normatively valuable, in designing the institu-
tions through which we interact. According to Rosenberg, what matters for design 
purposes are not actual institutional outcomes but counterfactual outcomes if eve-
ryone were classically rational, because institutions must be robust: they must work 
even in the case in which everyone were, in Hume’s words, a “knave” (1742). Geof-
frey Brennan and James M. Buchanan (1983; 1985) make similar arguments. The 
basis of these arguments is a kind of precautionary reasoning12: as we have seen, 
incentive compatibility delimits feasible social welfare; but incentive-incompatible 
institutions produce adverse incentives that may diminish welfare much more. This 
point can be made more precise in the example from the previous section. We saw 
that the incentive-compatible, 5/6-mechanism yields both players an expected profit 
of 16.67, which is the maximum feasible welfare when the traders are strategic. 
While players could reach a higher expected profit (17.5) in the incentive-incom-
patible, split-the-difference mechanism, if they could commit to being honest about 
their types, their loss in welfare would be considerably more severe if they failed to 
act on their commitment: there is an equilibrium in which both traders falsely report 
strong types when they are weak with a probability of 3/5, and the expected payoff 
in this equilibrium is only 10 for both traders.
The asymmetry of the possible welfare losses provides a reason for treating 
incentive compatibility as a general constraint where actual behavior is uncertain; 
or, in other words, a social planner should require incentive compatibility as a 
12 Hausman (1998) criticizes these arguments, maintaining that the normative value of economic the-
ory for the design of institutions should only depend on the empirical question of whether the theory 
accurately predicts behavior. We need not take a stance here on this disagreement: since Hausman pre-
sents himself as more optimistic about the predictive accuracy of orthodox rational choice theory than 




default, which should be overridden only if there is very good evidence that indi-
vidual behavior will approach the recommendations of non-classical rationality in 
particular institutional arrangements and that we can thus go without it. So the bur-
den of proof appears to be on proponents of non-classical concepts who contend 
that we should go without it. Furthermore, this point may reinforce the empirical 
evidence for the importance of incentive compatibility, as surveyed by McFadden 
(2009), suggesting, at the very least, that classical rationality is a good approxima-
tion in institutional settings and that non-classical approaches will thus have a hard 
time living up to their burden of proof. In combination, these arguments go some 
way towards urging that the first option, that is, doing away with incentive com-
patibility, should be resisted. While this result is contrary to Sugden’s proposal, I 
will suggest below that Sugden’s own theory of team reasoning also lends itself to 
a different interpretation, which would support treating incentive compatibility as a 
general constraint.
4.2  Institutions for the irrational?
If a proponent of non-classical rationality is reluctant to reject incentive compatibil-
ity as a general constraint, they could reason thus: “we should not expect individu-
als interacting through institutions to follow the ideals of non-classical rationality; 
rather, we should expect them to follow best-reply reasoning, and for this reason, 
incentive compatibility should generally be required. Because the individuals can-
not reap the fruits of cooperation, they are irrational.” This is the second possible 
option for aligning non-classical rationality with incentive compatibility as a general 
constraint.
This imagined proponent of non-classical rationality, however, is likely to be a 
fiction; for one of the fundamental principles of economic theory, which is almost 
universally adopted, is the assumption that individuals are instrumentally rational 
(Herfeld, 2020), and reformers of the rationality concept are unlikely to be will-
ing to give up this assumption, often stressing that human beings can, and often 
do, meet their rationality standards. For instance, Gauthier endorses the “concep-
tion of human beings as rational (or potentially rational) individual actors” (1987, 
p. 93). In fact, qualms with the classical assumption that rational individuals cannot 
achieve optimal outcomes in certain games, such as Prisoners’ Dilemmas, appear to 
be among the main reasons for proposing non-classical concepts in the first place. 
Proponents of these concepts demand that stringent rationality requirements be 
applied, and it would be an odd view to demand this while denying that people can 
meet these requirements when interacting through institutions. The option of deny-
ing people’s rationality thus looks rather dismal.
However, perhaps this is premature, as it might be possible to spell out this option 
more favorably, at least for some versions of non-classical theories. So far, I have 
described non-classical theories as implying that agents are irrational whenever 
they do not constrain their maximization, or do not reason as a team. While this is 
true for some versions of these theories (e.g. Hurley might be seen as a proponent 
of this view), for other versions, the assumption would suffice that only some, not 
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all, individuals are irrational, in order for their theory to be consistent with incentive 
compatibility as a general constraint. For example, remember that constrained maxi-
mizers will rationally defect in Prisoner’s Dilemmas when a sufficiently large fraction 
of the population are defectors, and depending on the level of translucency. Similarly, 
if a fraction of agents renege on their commitment to reveal information honestly or 
to act obediently in an incentive-incompatible institution, it might be rational for the 
others to do the same, according to constrained maximization. For some varieties of 
team reasoning, similar arguments could be constructed. For instance, according to 
Sugden (2015), in order to follow team reasoning, a player requires assurance that the 
other player(s) do so as well—which might not be the case if other players are irra-
tional. Anticipating that individuals would rationally defect in an incentive-incompat-
ible institution in the presence of irrational individuals, proponents of these theories 
could argue that the institution should be designed to be incentive-compatible. This 
line of argument nevertheless commits proponents of non-classical concepts to the 
assumption that some of the individuals are irrational, which might be deemed unde-
sirable. Alternatively, these proponents could retain incentive compatibility for the 
same reason that drivers wear seatbelts: we don’t expect the accident to happen, but 
why take a chance? Similarly, imposing incentive compatibility would be the conse-
quence of a kind of precautionary reasoning: “while we don’t expect this, there might 
be a decisive fraction of irrational individuals who won’t cooperate, which may result 
in universal defection, even when other people are rational. In the face of this uncer-
tainty, we had better take preventive action and impose incentive compatibility as a 
general constraint, because failing to do so entails the risk of bringing about socially 
undesirable outcomes.”
While some proponents of non-classical concepts might adopt this strategy in 
order to bring their theories in line with incentive-compatible institutional design, 
it comes at a cost. There is an asymmetry between classical theories of rational-
ity and non-classical theories when combined with this strategy; while under the 
former, incentive compatibility should be imposed as a constraint because people 
are assumed to be rational, under the latter this would be seen a constraint because 
people are potentially irrational and despite the expectation that they are rational. 
Thus, while under classical theories, the rationality principle provides the rationale 
for treating incentive compatibility as a constraint, this is not the case for non-clas-
sical theories; in these theories, the rationale for this constraint would rather be pro-
vided by the possibility that individuals are irrational, that is, by the negation of the 
rationality principle. For theorists committed to this principle, this puts non-classi-
cal theories at a disadvantage. Furthermore, given the significance of the rational-
ity principle for economic theory, and the fact that it is almost universally adopted, 
this strategy is unlikely to attract many followers among reformers of the rationality 
concept.
4.3  (Halfway) back to the orthodoxy
If a proponent of a revisionist concept of rationality does not want to reject incentive 
compatibility as a general constraint (claim (1.) above), or to assume that individuals 
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interacting through the designed institutions are irrational (claim (2.)), this seems 
to be a self-defeating position, at least at first glance: they want incentive compat-
ibility and they want to treat people as rational, but their rationality standards don’t 
allow for both. Their remaining option seems to be to overthrow their standards, 
that is, to concede that rational individuals should not be expected to constrain their 
maximization or to reason as a team when interacting through institutions. In other 
words, they would concur that non-classical rationality does not cover institutional 
design; rather, a concept of classical rationality should apply here. They would seem 
to overthrow their project of reforming the rationality concept and become propo-
nents of the orthodoxy.
However, it is possible to provide an alternative interpretation of some (though 
not all) non-classical theories, which would block this stark conclusion. We could 
interpret these theories as allowing for a more inclusive concept of rationality; 
attempting to rationalize some courses of action which classical theories deem out-
right irrational, without denying the rationality of classical behavior.13 Indeed, some 
of the non-classical theories that we encountered earlier can be interpreted in a way 
that accommodates such an inclusive concept.14 For instance, as we have seen, for 
Sugden and Bacharach, rational choice is conditional on the choice of agency, and 
when the units of agency are singletons, their theories yield classical rationality as a 
special case. Furthermore, since, in their theories, the choice of agency is not itself 
subject of rational deliberation, there is nothing irrational about choosing in line 
with classical rationality; rather, choices are irrational if conditioned on the “wrong” 
combinations of agency and reasoning (e.g. if a player were to defect in a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma while identifying and seeking to attain the best outcome for a team, or if a 
player were to cooperate in this game while acting as a singleton). Thus, their theo-
ries can be interpreted as entailing that neither classical nor non-classical strategies 
are outright irrational; that is, as rationalising more strategies than the classical con-
ception of rationality allows. But if more strategies, including classical strategies, 
can be rationalised in this way, there is, as a matter of logic, no conflict with treating 
incentive compatibility as a general constraint.
While Sugden’s theory, in particular, lends itself to this inclusive interpretation, it 
should be noted that it does not imply Sugden’s proposal above, according to which 
incentive compatibility should be given up in cases where individuals identify as a 
team. In contrast, I suggest that the inclusive interpretation is not only consistent 
with treating incentive compatibility as a general constraint, but that it may also pro-
vide a novel argument for doing so. If both classical and non-classical strategies are 
deemed rational and if, in addition, we assume that people will behave rationally in 
this inclusive sense, how should a mechanism be designed? An important goal may 
be not to introduce incentives whereby classical and non-classical recommendations 
13 I am much indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this interpretation and for providing the 
better part of the arguments to follow.
14 Other non-classical theories we encountered above, such as Hurley (2005a, b), or Gauthier (2015), do 
not seem to provide for an inclusive concept as they appear to entail that, when their recommendations 
diverge from classical behaviour, the latter should be deemed irrational.
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come apart; for otherwise the mechanism might fail to align incentives with the 
social goal in question even when agents are rational. So suppose the designer’s goal 
is to align the incentives of classical and non-classical reasoners in this way; then 
the designed mechanism should not be incentive-incompatible, because if it were, 
classical reasoners may in some cases “defect” (in our running example, lie about 
their types when they could profit from it), whereas non-classical reasoners would 
“cooperate” (be honest about their types), which would contradict the designer’s 
goal that their incentives be aligned. Because the result would thus be equivalent to 
proceeding on the assumption that people are individually (classically) rational, this 
may provide a non-classical argument for treating incentive compatibility as a gen-
eral constraint when non-classical theories are interpreted as sustaining an inclusive 
concept of rationality.
5  Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to draw out some implications that a re-engineering of 
the rationality concept would entail in relation to institutional design. I argued that 
starkly revisionist programs are at odds with the standard methodology of treating 
incentive compatibility as a general constraint on institutional design. Proponents 
of these programs have three options to resolve this conflict, all of which seem to be 
undesirable from their perspective. First, they could reject incentive compatibility 
as a general constraint, but they would thereby risk wasting social welfare. Second, 
they could keep this constraint, while treating the individuals interacting through the 
designed institutions as irrational; yet, this option looks rather unappealing from the 
perspective of the proponents of non-classical concepts and it shows an advantage of 
classical concepts, which are in line with the constraint of incentive compatibility. 
Third, they could grant that their revised rationality concept does not cover institu-
tional design, which would, however, seem to present an argument for classical con-
cepts of rationality. The modest lesson I draw from this analysis is that revisionist 
programs concerning concepts that occupy important places in social scientific theo-
ries should be evaluated relative to what changes they would necessitate in those 
theories and in how they bear on the social world, and whether these changes would 
be desirable. Facing three undesirable options, starkly non-classical projects do not 
seem to pass this test in relation to institutional design. A more modest interpretation 
of some non-classical accounts, such as Sugden’s, would warrant more optimism, 
allowing for a more inclusive concept of rationality, which is consistent with treating 
incentive compatibility as a general constraint; indeed, non-classical accounts may 
then provide a novel argument for this standard methodology.15
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